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Abstract
Prices and quantities converge to the theoretical competitive equilibria in continuous,
double auction markets. The double auction is not a tatonnement mechanism. Disequi-
librium trades take place. The absence of any influence of disequilibrium trades, which
have the capacity to change the theoretical equilibrium, appears to be due to a property
found in the Marshallian model of single market adjustments. The Marshallian model
incorporates a principle of self-organizing, coordination that mysteriously determines the
sequence in which specific pairs of agents trade in an environment in which market iden-
tities and agent preferences are not public. Disequilibrium trades along the Marshallian
path of trades do not change the theoretical equilibrium. The substance of this paper is
to demonstrate that the Marshallian principle captures a natural tendency of the adjust-
ment in single, continuous, double auction markets and to suggest how it takes place.
The Marshallian model of quantity adjustment and the Walrasian model of market price
adjustment can be seen as companion theories that explain the allocation and price pro-
cesses of a market. The Marshallian model explains the evolution of the allocation, who
will meet and trade, and the Walrasian excess demand explains the evolution of prices
when they do.
JEL classification numbers: B10, B12, D01, D03, D46
Key words: market micro structure, price discovery, price dynamics, market volume,
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MARSHALL AND WALRAS, DISEQUILIBRIUM TRADES AND THE DYNAMICS OF 
EQUILIBRATION IN THE CONTINUOUS DOUBLE AUCTION MARKET 
Charles Plott*, Nilanjan Roy*, and Baojia Tong* 
  
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we explore the possibility that an empirical regularity of the market convergence 
process removes the theoretical need to assume that markets are organized by the Walrasian 
tatonnement. Of course, the idea of tatonnement and the assumption that no trades take place at 
disequilibrium prices are deeply engrained in economic theory. Indeed, it is sometimes asserted 
that the theory works only if the market mechanism is the fictional Walrasian auctioneer.  The 
results reported here suggest that, at least in the case of a single market, the almost universally 
employed abstraction of tatonnement is unnecessary.  Substantial parts of market level behavior 
can be successfully modeled by an empirical assumption made by Marshall even though many 
questions about individual behavior remain unanswered. 
 
The use of the Walrasian auctioneer and tatonnement metaphors seems to have taken their 
modern form in a controversy between Walras and Edgeworth about the nature of market 
convergence.  The controversy turned on the possibility that the equilibrium itself would shift in 
response to disequilibrium trades. Edgeworth maintained that there is no general dynamical 
theory determining the path of the economic system from any point assigned at random to a 
position of equilibrium.  He looked to a theory of recontracting as the foundations of a dynamical 
theory.1  Walras looked to the application of special instruments and market processes and from 
those discussions the metaphorical auctioneer took form.  Interestingly, at about the same time, 
the 1890’s, Marshall advanced a theory of dynamics that resolves the Walras-Edgeworth 
controversy (refer to appendix H of Marshall, 1961 eighth edition, p. 806) in the case of a single 
market. However, the Marshallian theory was not examined as part of the controversy and seems 
to have gone substantially unnoticed in the literature that followed.  Marshall was not challenged 
to generalize to the simultaneous equilibrium of multiple markets, the primary concern of Walras 
and Edgeworth.  The oversight might be due to the fact that the Marshallian theory rests on a 
very special behavioral assumption that the order in which traders make purchases and sales is 
dictated by the relative size of their demand and supply prices.  On the surface, the behavioral 
property seems very implausible.  However, the results reported here demonstrate that the 
Marshallian behavioral assumption is not only plausible, it can be observed operating in 
experimental, double auction markets. 
                                            
* The financial support of the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation and the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and 
Political Science is gratefully acknowledged. 
1 Details of this controversy are found in Walker (1996). Discussions of Walras’s ideas of tatonnement can be found in Walker 
(1987). 
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Kaldor seems to have anticipated the evolution of theory in light of the controversy with the 
summary “While Edgeworth’s analysis may be slightly obscure and Walras’ assumption slightly 
ridiculous, the main idea stands clear: in so far as there is any initial ‘haggling and bargaining’ 
this should be done by playing with ‘chips’ and not with ‘hard cash’.” (See D. Walker, 1973, 
p.138.)  The tatonnement model, in which no trades take place at disequilibrium prices and is 
widely applied to general equilibrium, suggests resolution of the issue in terms of current theory. 
(see Kenneth J. Arrow and F.H. Hahn, 1971, p.264- 270) Of course, special theoretical efforts 
exist to explore convergence through non-tatonnement; as examples see (Hahn and Negishi 
(1962), Fisher (1972), Levine (1996) and recontracting (Uzawa (1962), Green (1974)).  
However, theory notwithstanding, experimental work has largely proceeded through a study of 
the non-tatonnement, continuous double auction in which disequilibrium trades are made. 
Continuous double auction markets are observed converging to the competitive equilibrium with 
great reliability. However, the reason for the convergence is unknown and regarded as a pressing 
question, especially in the light of the Walras and Edgeworth discussions. 
In order to appreciate the challenge to theory presented by the observed equilibration together 
with the perplexing nature of the equilibration process, some details of the continuous double 
auction trading mechanism are needed as background information. The continuous double 
auction allows agents to publicly submit bids to buy and asks to sell in continuous time.  Bids to 
buy are typically arranged from high to low in an order book and asks to sell are arranged from 
low to high.  The identity of the agents and the preferences of agents are all private information.  
Trades occur when a buyer tenders a bid to buy that is above the lowest offer to sell that exists in 
the order book or when a seller tenders an ask to sell that is below the highest bid to buy that 
exists in the order book. Trade prices are public but the identities of the traders are known only 
in the form of abstract identification numbers if they are known at all. Of significance in this 
institutional setting is the general lack of information about trading partners that one might think 
necessary for coordination and for the development of trading strategies. Indeed, information 
required for the level of coordination assumed by the Marshallian theory would seem to be 
entirely absent. Continuous double auctions without the order book have been studied but will 
not be considered here. 
A modern representation2 of the two classical theories, Marshall and Walras, are illustrated in 
Figure 1.  Walras is found in almost any current textbook.  Market demand and supply are 
displayed in the usual sense. If the price is P*, the excess demand is D(P*)- S(P*) as shown.  The 
Walrasian tatonnement adjustment process holds that dP is a function of excess demand, dP = 
f(D(P)- S(P)).  Equilibrium in the model is a P** such that D(P**) – S(P**) = 0.  It is important 
to notice that the model has no facility for identifying trading partners.  Individuals appear in no 
particular order in this construction since both D(P*) and S(P*) depend only on the quantity 
individuals demand at P* (the sums) and not in some particular order dictated by preference or 
                                            
2 Both Marshall and Walras produced detailed variations of their theories as well as the types of institutions that 
might support the processes that they imagined.  See Walker(1996). 
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personal indicator. There is no theory about who trades with whom or the order in which trades 
occur. If trades do take place at prices other than the equilibrium, the presumption is that the 
functions will change form and the equilibrium itself will change. 
Marshall has a different approach.3  While the Marshallian theory appears to be just the inverse 
of the Walrasian theory, in fact, it is much more.  Marshall places his theory on quantity 
adjustment – volume.  Volume will increase if demand price is greater than supply price.  In 
Figure 1, let Q* be the existing quantity. The demand price is Pd(Q*) and the supply price is 
Ps(Q*).  The Marshallian market adjustment model holds that dQ depends on the difference 
between the demand price and the supply price. If Pd(Q*) - Ps(Q*)> 0 then quantity increases and 
equilibrium in the model is the Q** such that Pd(Q**) - Ps(Q**) = 0.  Marshall makes no 
assumptions about price, other than the trade price is between the demand price and the supply 
price.  Unlike the Walrasian model, the Marshallian model does not assume that all trades take 
place at the same price so multiple prices can emerge. However, the Marshallian model by 
construction incorporates the implicit assumption that the trades occur between specific traders 
and that the trading pairs trade in a specific order. The buyer with the highest demand price 
remaining in the market trades with the seller with the lowest supply price remaining in the 
market.  Clearly, the Marshallian theory is not simply the inverse of the Walrasian theory.  It 
adds a very strong assumption about trading patterns that has been called the “Marshallian path”.   
By contrast, it is relevant to notice that the Walrasian model assumes that there is a single price P 
in the market while in the continuous double auction there is no single price. In the double 
auction, prices change with each trade.  Furthermore, within the Walrasian model, due to the fact 
that the market demands and supply curves are a sum of the (inverse) individual demands and 
supplies, the curves can shift with each trade depending on who happens to trade. Nevertheless 
the observed dynamics of the continuous double auction markets support elements of the 
Walrasian tatonnement model in the sense that the equilibrium of the dynamic model, 0 = dP = 
f(D(P**)- S(P**)) = f(0), is observed even though the shapes of the functions themselves can be 
shifting as a result of trades.  In the context of the Walrasian model, a paradox of non-
tatonnement adjustment becomes apparent. How can the theory have predictive power when the 
theory itself says that it should not apply?  
The experiments reported here test for the existence of the Marshallian path in the continuous 
double auction.  The data analysis is sequential in which questions are posed based on the 
answers to previous questions.  The results demonstrate (Section 5) that the Marshallian path 
exists in the data.  Having established the existence of the Marshallian path in the data then the 
                                            
3 His theory is most clearly seen when he discusses the conditions for stability. See Marshall appendix H, eighth 
edition, p. 806 where he gives his multiple equilibrium stability graph.  Our interpretations of the Marshallian 
market model are focused only on the market level aggregation of individual demand and supply curves as opposed 
to how the market aggregations might be derived from or related to individual incentives, bidding strategies or 
market instruments.  Similarly, when interpreting the Marshallian dynamics theory, we are only considering market 
level adjustments as opposed to how individual decisions might make them come about. Different discussions at the 
individual level of analysis can be found at Svensson (1984), Vroey (1999), and Zaratiegui (2002). 
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analysis becomes focused on ideas about how and why it emerges.  Since, the obvious sources of 
coordinating information are absent due to the limited public information in the experimental 
double auction, it is only natural to ask how such self-organizing behavior can  take place.  Three 
theories present themselves for analysis. One theory holds that the highest demander and the 
lowest supplier have the greatest latitude for trade and that competitively placed bids and asks as 
guided by the continuous double auction have them more likely meeting in the market.  A second 
theory holds that chance plays an important role, and that randomly placed bids and asks 
consistent with not losing money produces the correlation between gains from trade and 
sequence. A third theory holds that the internal motivation for trade presented by the utility of 
potential gains has those with the greatest potential gains finding their way to the front of the 
line.  Our results suggest that it is the first of these three theories best accounts for the data. 
Before continuing to discuss the experiments, it is useful to observe how the Marshallian theory 
and the Walrasian theory fit to create a more coherent picture of market dynamics than does 
either separately.  If trades follow the Marshallian path then the demand and supply functions do 
not shift with each trade.  Excess demand at various prices is not changed by the trading so the 
Walrasian model captures a measured force on the price changes. Thus, the Marshallian path 
adds a degree of coherence to the Walrasian theory of price dynamics. The Marshallian path also 
suggests that market adjustment follow the path of most rapid wealth creation.  Wealth creation 
is through realized gains from trade and the Marshallian path has those that represent the greatest 
gains trading first. However, we hasten to add that how the theory might work in multiple 
markets and multiple unit trades is yet to be investigated. 
 
SECTION 2: BACKGROUND EXPERIMENTAL WORK 
Experimental markets converge to the static equilibrium predicted by the model.4 While there is 
no detailed theory of the equilibration process (Easley and Ledyard (1992) being an obvious 
exception), important features of the Walrasian dynamics are found in experimental markets 
(Plott (2000), Anderson, et al. (2003), Crockett, et al. (forthcoming), Hirota, et al. (2005). In 
addition, evidence does exist in support of the Marshallian path (Cason and Friedman (1996)) 
but for the case of externality driven instabilities, the Marshallian dynamics is supported as 
opposed to the Walrasian dynamics (Plott and George, 1992)  There is also evidence that a 
Marshallian path can result from purely random behavior (Gode and Sunder (1993)), Chapter 3 
in Schredelseker and Hauser (2008) or randomness with slight biases toward the prices of past 
trades (Brewer (2008)) and simulations Zhan et al. (2002a, 2002b), Posada et al. (2007, 2008). 
Additional suggestions of the Marshallian paths are found in finance for both the CAPM 
(Bossaerts, et al. (2001)), and in information aggregation in finance experiments (Barner, et al. 
(2005)).  While patterns are very suggestive that disequilibria are resolved through the 
                                            
4 Several good accounts of this phenomenon are summarized in Plott and Smith: Handbook of  Experimental 
Economics Results (2008). 
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Marshallian path of trades, the experiments reported here are designed to directly test that 
possibility.  
 
SECTION 3: THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN CHALLENGE 
Testing for the elements of the Marshallian path is complicated due to the many variables that 
must be controlled for a meaningful measurement. The experimental design reflects the 
following considerations. 
1.  All agents should place value on a single unit.  If agents had multiple units and those units 
had different values there would be an issue about which unit was considered traded first and 
which unit should count for the trader to have traded before some other. 
2.  The experiment should permit the measurement of behavior of agents who are placed at 
different positions on the market demand and supply curves. 
3.  The experiment should control for individual differences in the sense that the parameters 
should place different individuals in the same situation for measurement and observation. 
4.  The experiment should control for different levels of internal motivation in the sense of the 
underlying potential rewards as measured in dollars. 5 
5.  The demands and supplies should be symmetric to control for known directions of 
convergence reflecting asymmetries in consumer and produce surplus. 
6.  Price expectation should be controlled by having different demands, supplies and resulting 
equilibrium price each period and having no obvious pattern.  Market quantity should be the 
same so market quantity provides no hint of underlying parameters. 
7.  The market institution should be well tested and computerized so issues of subtle market 
details and leaking information are controlled.   
In order to deal with issues 2, 3, and 4, induced preferences are structured as different “types” 
and individuals are assigned a “type” which are rotated among subjects in different periods in 
order to implement the appropriate experimental controls.  The types are differentiated along two 
characteristics.  The first characteristic, called the “franc type” determines the place a subject is 
found on the demand or supply curve.  The second characteristic, called the “incentive type” is 
determined by the translation of francs into U.S. dollars.  Trading takes place in francs but the 
strength of incentives is founded in dollars.  After explaining the details of the types we will 
explain how they are rotated to exercise the needed controls. 
                                            
5 Subject transactions are in the form of an experimental currency called francs.  The exchange rate between francs 
and dollars was a treatment variable. 
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The first characteristic, the “franc type”, is the magnitude of the demand and supply prices 
measured in terms of francs, the experimental currency.  For the demand side and the supply 
side, six basic franc types are used.  The demanders (suppliers) with the largest (smallest) 
redemption value (cost) are indexed as H and agents on both sides of the markets with just 
slightly less advantageous values are labeled as h.  For analysis purposes, the data from these two 
franc types will be pooled and called Hp.  Agents with franc incentive types near the middle of 
the market demand and supply curves are labeled as M and m. The agents with the least 
advantageous incentives are labeled as L and l.  The pooled variables will be designated as Mp 
and Lp, respectively. 
Subject were partitioned into two “incentive types”, R and r, that designated the translation of 
francs into U.S. currency. Three of the six demand side subjects and three of the six supply side 
subjects were given “high exchange rates” (.65 cents per franc) indicated as R, and the others 
were given “low exchange rates” (.02 cents per franc), indicated as r.  These initial assignments 
were in place for six periods and then the exchange rates were switched in the sense that those 
that previously had low exchange rates were given high and vice versa. The experiment 
continued six more periods after the switch. 
The six buyer franc types and six seller franc types are contained in Figure 2 and displayed in a 
manner that demonstrates the relationship with the equilibrium price.  Issue 5 is addressed by the 
fact that the consumer and producer surplus are equal. Thus, the direction of convergence to the 
equilibrium is controlled for a known influence by virtue of the symmetry.  
Issue six is addressed in two ways.  First, the franc types are rotated among the six demand 
(supply) subjects such that each of the six types is assigned exactly once in the first six periods 
and exactly once the second six periods.  The slight difference between the H and h, M and m, L 
and l allowed the same subject to be essentially the same type twice without the subject being 
alerted.  Secondly, each round a constant (positive or negative) was added to the francs of all 
types each period so the demand and supplies shifted up or down in a manner that created the 
same constant change in the equilibrium price.  Thus, the equilibrium shifted each period while 
the individual types rotated making it very difficult, if not impossible, for a subject to detect the 
nature of the shifts.  
Subjects were informed of their incentives, franc values, and exchange rates, at the beginning of 
each period.  The information was delivered electronically through the experimental market 
software of Marketscape. Subjects were not informed of the exchange rate of any other subject, 
the franc values of other subjects or even the fact that the franc values of others were changing. 
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SECTION 4: EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
 
A total of four experiments were conducted. Each experiment consisted of 12 subjects and 12 
periods plus one practice period. Each subject had the capacity to trade only one unit during each 
period of the experiment and no one was allowed to buy and resell units. Redemption values and 
costs were stated in an experimental currency called francs. Francs could be transformed into 
U.S. dollars at a specified exchange rate. The two characteristics, the “franc” type and the 
“incentive” type allow us to study the impact of each of these on the timing of trade decisions 
and actions by the traders. This rotating feature was described in Section 3. The exact parameters 
are discussed in Section 4.1.Trading was conducted through a computerized double auction 
system, Marketscape, which operates through an open book and is described in section 3.2. 
Section 3.3 discusses the experimental procedures. Subjects were recruited from the subject data 
base for the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science. They were 
paid a show-up fee of 10 U.S. dollars plus whatever they earned in the experiment. 
 
4.1 Parameters 
For all periods of all experiments, there were six buyers and six sellers, each allowed to trade at 
most once. The currency was denominated in francs.  
 
Parameters were keyed to a "base" demand and supply. This base shifted up and down across 
periods by large constants so the shapes of the market demand and supply were the same across 
periods except for the price intercept, which changed from period to period. Since the constant 
amounted to an equal shift upward or downward in both the demand and supply curves, the 
equilibrium across the periods differed only by the same constant. As is explained later, 
individual incentives were rotated so each period an individual faced different incentives but 
those incentives were the same as the incentives faced by some other subject in a different 
period. Figure 2 illustrates the nature of the base demand and supply.  
 
The redemption values and costs for the subjects for all periods are detailed in Table 1.  Indeed, 
the exact parameters used in all periods and across all subjects are shown in Table 1(a) and (b). 
Notice that if trades take place at equilibrium then given the type, the profits in francs were the 
franc values: 400, 390, 150, 140, 25 and -15 for types H, h, M, m, L, l respectively.  
 
Before proceeding to the market organization, let us summarize notations which will be used 
throughout for the possible types of traders. As mentioned above, for purposes of statistical 
analysis, some of the groups are pooled.  Denote the pooled sets of franc/redemption value types 
by Hp (high), Mp (middle) and Lp (low) where Hp includes both the H and h types, Mp includes 
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both the M and m types, and Lp includes L and l types6. Denote the exchange rate type as either 
R (high/ 2 cents) or r (low/ .65 cent). Then denote a trader type as ij, where i denotes the 
redemption value type and j denotes the exchange rate type. For example, a trader type Hpr has a 
high redemption value and a low exchange rate. 
 
4.2 Market Organization  
 
All the experiments were done at the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and 
Political Science (EEPS)7. Each experiment used 12 Caltech undergraduate/graduate students 
who were randomly assigned ID numbers. Each subject was located at a laboratory computer and 
was logged in to the appropriate URL. Instructions consisted of a simple, written overview given 
in the appendix followed by a supervised practice period in which subjects bought and sold to 
each other without monetary payoffs.  The detail of instructions were computerized . The trading 
technology was conducted on a virtual machine 8.  An interactive program allowing practice with 
the trading technology is available at http://eeps.caltech.edu/expt.html. Apart from public 
questions posed to the experimenter, the communication between subjects was prohibited. Each 
subject operated in two markets: one was a public market, where public orders to buy from (or 
sell to) other subjects were placed and the other was a private market in which the subject traded 
with the experimenter (these served as the redemption values and costs of classical experimental 
economics). In the private market, orders could only be seen by the subject herself and only one 
unit could be exchanged. Orders sent to the public market were placed in an open book, where 
they remained until accepted by someone or cancelled by the subject placing the order. 
 
4.3. Experimental Procedures 
Subjects were given an information sheet for maintaining records. Subjects logged in and were 
randomly assigned to be either a buyer or seller. Then the experimenter announced the location 
of the web instructions, and explained the use of private and public market. The experimenter 
also led a demonstration on submitting orders, canceling orders, trading, and computing profits. 
Following the instructions, a five minute-practice period started. The subjects’ computations 
were checked for mistakes during the practice period. The software required subjects to collect 
redemption values by sale to the experimenter in their private markets and to do this before the 
period ended. Thus, thirty seconds before each period ended, the experimenter asked the subjects 
to pay attention and clear their inventories if they had not done so. 
 
                                            
6 Since the difference in the (francs) profits between H and h is small, we have grouped them together for the 
purpose of statistical analysis.  Thus, both H and h are pooled together into the Hp group. Similar reason holds for 
the Mp group. Note however, that l has a negative (franc) profit if trade takes place at the equilibrium price while L 
has a positive profit. Still we group them together as they are very close to each other in terms of profits in francs. 
7 The exact dates being 27 Feb 2010, 10 Mar 2010, 15 Mar 2010 and 22 Mar 2010. 
8 See http://marketscape.caltech.edu/wiki.  It also has resources on related experiments, including detailed 
demonstrations. 
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Before each period started, the subjects were asked to write down their exchange rate that was 
sent to them privately through Marketscape. The first period was a practice period. After this 
practice period, subjects were told that they were making decisions for actual money, and this 
continued for 12 periods with each period being 4 minutes in length (240 seconds). No subject 
knew that the experiment would last only 12 periods until the last period was completed, at 
which time they were told to compute the total profits. Subjects recorded the difference between 
their final franc value and their initial franc value to determine their final profit in francs. 
Subjects calculated their profit in dollar values, submitted the information sheet and were paid in 
dollars. 
 
 
SECTION 5: RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS 
This section discusses the results and is divided into five sub-sections. Section 5.1 analyzes the 
convergence of market prices. Results on the effect of difference in the position on the demand 
and supply curve and incentives on the timing of trades are given in Section 5.2 and Section 5.3 
presents the corresponding results for all acts, defined as a bid to buy, an ask to sell, a take-bid, a 
take-ask, or a cancellation in the market. Section 5.4 discusses the results on the profitability of 
the market versus limit orders differentiated by the trader types and proportion of limit to market 
orders submitted by different trader types. We also analyze the effect of experience of subjects 
on the above results and provide some observations in Section 5.5. 
 
5.1. Convergence of Market Prices 
 
Figure 3 describes the behavior of equilibrium prices across periods. Note the shift every period. 
It also plots the mean and median trade prices (pooled across the four experiments) for each 
period. Notice that that the mean/median prices shift each period and track the shifting 
equilibrium quite well. This tracking property is captured by the first result that convergence to 
the competitive equilibrium occurs across periods even with the parameters shifting.  
 
Result 1. Trade prices tend to move towards the competitive equilibrium across periods. 
 
Support: Table 2 contains the results of the estimation of the Ashenfelter/El-Gamal9 (AEIG) 
model of market convergence, which allows different experiments to be idiosyncratically off-
equilibrium in early periods but assumes that they all converge to the same point by their final 
period. 
   ௜ܲ௧ െ  ௜ܲ௧௘௤ ൌ  ∑ ܦ௜௜ ܤଵ௜ ቀଵ௧ቁ ൅ ܤଶ ቀ1 െ
ଵ
௧ቁ ൅  ݑ௜௧ 
where i is the experiment, t is the period, and the Bs are the coefficients to be estimated. Pit  is 
the average price of a trade in period t of the experiment i. Di takes value 1 if the experiment is i 
                                            
9 This model was first used in Noussair et al. (1995) and subsequently in Jamison and Plott (1997). 
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and zero otherwise. Piteq is the equilibrium price predicted by the competitive model in period t 
of the experiment i. 
 
The model is designed to deal with both the facts of multiple periods and multiple experiments 
with possible different rates of convergence. The dependent variable is the divergence from the 
equilibrium price. The measured variables B1i measure the starting point of prices for experiment 
i that is relied upon less and less as t grows and in the limit receives no weight at all. The fact 
that each experiment has its own B1i variable reflects the need for the measurement to 
acknowledge the fact that experiments start differently. During later periods, as t grows, the 
weight shifts from experiment-specific measurements to the common measurement B2. If the 
data are normalized so the equilibrium price is zero, then if the dependent variable converges to 
the equilibrium price the value of B2 should be zero if the data are near the competitive price 
during the later periods. The coefficient B2 is an estimate of the asymptotic behavior of the time 
series that is to be compared with the equilibrium prediction of the competitive model.  
The regression results are displayed in Table 2. B2 is estimated to be -6.75 francs. The large p-
value corresponding to the B2 coefficient suggests that we cannot reject the hypothesis that B2 = 
0 even at high levels of significance. Thus we can conclude that convergence to the competitive 
equilibrium occurs across periods even with parameters shifting10.   
 
A comparison of the data in the initial periods, the B1i terms, further supports the conclusion of 
convergence. These terms estimate the initial starting points of the contract prices during the first 
period of the experiment. These values are far away from the equilibrium prediction of zero so 
system movement towards zero is evidence of an equilibration dynamic11. 
5.2. Trades 
 
Since there were four experiments conducted and each experiment has 12 periods, there are in 
total observations on 48 periods. However, due to a lack of close monitoring, in 12 of those 
periods there were more than one trade done by at least one of the traders. Below we use only 
those 36 periods in which each trader transacted at most once. The results reported in this section 
are based on the pooling of data for each period across time. Grouping subjects into two distinct 
categories of exchange rate allows us to analyze the effect of higher potential profits (in francs)12 
among traders on the timing of the trades separately for the high and low exchange rate 
population. After discussing the effect of different potential profits in francs on the timing of 
trades, we end this section with a discussion of the effect of different exchange rates on timing of 
                                            
10Cason and Friedman (1996) and Jamison and Plott (1997) also find that convergence to competitive equilibrium 
occurs across periods with shifting parameters. Thus, this first result can be viewed as a replication of those 
experiments. 
11 The evidence is that for most of the periods but not all (note that there are a total of 48 periods) trade prices tend 
to move towards the competitive equilibrium price during a particular period.  
12 Potential profits in francs/redemption value/valuation would be interchangeably used throughout this paper. 
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trades after controlling for the potential profits in francs among traders. We start with the 
following result. 
 
Result 2. Traders with higher potential profits in francs (profits relative to the equilibrium) trade 
earlier relative to other traders. 
 
Support: The average trading times from market open until trade for the Hp type, Mp type and Lp 
type are 74.67, 122.99 and 167.62 seconds respectively. This suggests that the traders with high 
redemption value trades earlier compared to the other types, the medium type traders trade 
earlier when compared with the traders with low redemption value. Table 3 gives the average 
trading time for each of these types subdivided by exchange rate type. For the high exchange rate 
the elapsed time before trade is 77.9 seconds for the Hp type and 110.43 and 175.09 for the Mp 
and Lp respectively. The low exchange rate reflects the same tendencies across the Hp, Mp and 
Lp.  Figure 4 shows the number of traders of each type Hp, Mp or Lp involved in trades occurring 
in each of the time-intervals mentioned. Clearly, most of the Hp type traders are involved in a 
trade occurring during the initial intervals, followed by the Mp types. Note that the traders of type 
Lp are trading more towards the end of the period. To provide statistical support for this 
phenomenon, we do two tests, the details of which we discuss below. 
 
We start by comparing the type HpR traders to the MpR types and use this case to illustrate in 
detail the specifics of the methodology used for all cases. This means that we are comparing the 
high redemption value traders with the middle valuation traders among the high exchange rate 
population. Figure 5 depicts the proportion of type HpR traders (p(HpR) in the Figure) and the 
proportion of MpR traders (p(MpR) in the Figure) involved in the trades till the tth second (both as 
a proportion of HpR + MpR traders). Thus, we always have p(HpR) + p(MpR) = 1. For example, 
if there are 10 traders of type (HpR + MpR) who are involved in the trades until say 5th second 
out of which only 3 are of HpR type, then p(HpR) till 5th second is 0.3 and p(MpR) until 5th 
second is 0.7.  
 
A high p(HpR) (considerably higher than p(MpR)) implies that more HpR traders are trading 
when compared to the MpR traders13. And a high p(HpR) in the initial seconds followed by a 
decline in the subsequent seconds till the closing of the market shows that the HpR traders are 
more active in the earlier seconds and become less and less active thereafter. Thus, from the 
Figure 5, one can readily infer that the HpR traders trade earlier when compared to the MpR 
traders. 
 
  
                                            
13 Also note that there are only two HpR traders for every two MpR traders. We have an equal number of traders for 
each of the types in each of the experiments. 
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For further understanding, we model the proportion pHpR over time using the following model: 
log(p(HpR)/1-p(HpR)) = Bi*(1/t) + Bf*(1-1/t) + uit 
uit = ρuit-1 + eit 
eit ~ N(0,ߪ)  
where, t denotes the time in seconds. Bi and Bf are the coefficients that are to be estimated14. Bi 
can be interpreted as the initial value (at the opening of the market) of the logarithm of the ratio 
of proportion of type HpR traders involved in trades to proportion of types MpR traders involved 
in trades and Bf can be thought of as the final value (towards the closing of the market) of the 
logarithm of ratio of the same proportions.  
 
We can use the difference in the coefficients Bi and Bf to test whether the HpR type traders are 
active during the initial seconds and become less active thereafter or whether they are active 
throughout. We test the null hypothesis that the final proportion is higher than or equal to the 
initial proportion: 
 
 Null hypothesis: Bf – Bi ൒ 0  
 Alternate hypothesis: Bf – Bi <0  
 
We obtain a p-value of 0.00. Thus, we reject the null that the final is greater than or equal to the 
initial coefficient, and conclude that the proportion of traders of type HpR (having higher 
potential profits when compared to MpR traders) in the trades towards the beginning of a period 
is significantly higher than the proportion of the same type of traders involved in total trades 
towards the end of the period.  This result demonstrates that the individuals who have higher 
potential profits are more active towards the beginning when compared to the end of a period. 
This is a qualitative conclusion because it does not test for the proposition that p(HpR) > p(MpR) 
during the initial seconds. To test for this more refined hypothesis, we run a series of binomial 
tests for different time intervals. See the first row of Table 4 for the p-values of the following test 
for different time intervals: 
 
 H0: p(HpR) ൑ p(MpR) or p(HpR) ൑ 0.5 
 H1: p(HpR) > p(MpR) or p(HpR) > 0.5 
 
The p-value is 0.003 for the first time interval 1-25 seconds. This implies that one can reject the 
null hypothesis that p(HpR) ൑ p(MpR) even at 1% level of significance. Note that as we move to 
the later periods, it becomes difficult to reject the null hypothesis. This clearly suggests that 
during the initial time intervals, more HpR traders are trading when compared to the MpR traders 
whereas more MpR traders are involved in trades towards the later time intervals when compared 
                                            
14 We model the logarithm of the ratio of proportions instead of the proportion itself for the obvious reason that we 
might get impossible predictions for proportions higher than one and also non-normal errors. 
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to the HpR traders. Thus, the above two tests help us to conclude that the HpR traders trade 
earlier than the MpR traders. 
 
Doing the similar analysis for the other binary comparisons, namely, HpR versus LpR, MpR 
versus LpR, Hpr versus Mpr, Hpr versus Lpr, and Mpr versus Lpr (see Table 5 and Table 4 for 
details on the different comparisons and the relevant p-values), we can conclude that the traders 
with relatively higher type trade earlier relative to the lower types except for one single case. In 
the case of Mpr versus Lpr, there is no indication of the higher types (Mpr) trading earlier. 
 
Additional support for Result 2 is provided by the time path of wealth creation from market 
activities.  The For the Walrasian stable case, the Marshallian path of transactions implies that 
the wealth created will form a quasi-concave function of time.15 Since the wealth created by 
trade is the gains from exchange and the gains are measured in francs, the proposition can be 
tested.  Figure 6 contains the accumulation of gains from exchange in francs each second from 
the beginning of an experimental period.  The data are fitted to a second degree polynomial 
function.  As can be seen, the quadratic is almost a perfect fit with R2 of .998.  This is an 
exceptionally strong test since the theoretical proposition holds if time is measured in terms of 
number of trades as opposed to clock time. In clock time, there will always be periods when no 
trade takes place thus causing “bumps” (small non concavities) in the data.16  
Having established that position on the inverse demand function is related to speed of 
transactions, the analysis now turns to the exchange rates. Is the speed of transactions related to 
“intrinsic motivations”? 
 
Result 3. Traders with higher exchange rate do not trade earlier relative to the low exchange 
rate traders. Exchange rate has no systematic effect on the timing of the trades. 
 
Support: The average trading times for the traders with high exchange rate (R) and low exchange 
rate (r) are 109.24 and 116.1 seconds respectively. This suggests that there is not much of an 
effect of difference in exchange rate on the timing of trades. Table 3 gives the average trading 
time for each of these types subdivided by redemption value type. The traders with high 
exchange rate trade later on an average (compared to the low exchange rate traders) among the 
high and low redemption value subgroups, whereas they trade earlier among the middle 
redemption value subgroup. 
 
                                            
15 Near unstable equilibria markets follow the dynamic predictions of the Walrasian model (See Plott, 2000) unless 
the instability is produced by an externality (Plott and George, 1992).  In the absence of an externality, an 
equilibrium that is stable according to Marshall but unstable according to Walras will find transactions moving away 
from the equilibrium towards the nearest stable Walrasian equilibrium even if the stable Walrasian equilibrium is 
less efficient. Thus, the market will follow a wealth decreasing path.  This pattern of dynamics is consistent across 
several different types of experimental markets. 
16  For the model “gains from trade at tth trade in theory = a + b[gains from trade in data] + e”, we find that the 95% 
confidence interval contains a=0, b=1.   
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Figure 7 shows the number of traders of each type R or r involved in trades occurring in each of 
the time-intervals mentioned. Again, it is clear from the figure that the traders with high 
exchange rate are not trading earlier in comparison to the low exchange rate traders.  
 
Before we advance to the next section, few points are worth noting. The binary comparisons also 
allow us to analyze the cases where both the redemption values and exchange rates of the traders 
are varied. These cases are given in the last six rows of Table 4 and are also contained in Table 5. 
It can be seen that the HpR type traders trade earlier when compared to either Mpr or Lpr clearly 
indicating that the traders with highest potential profits (HpR traders have the highest redemption 
value as well as high exchange rate) finish trading much earlier when compared to any of the 
other types, except the Hpr types. Also, the Hpr types trade earlier when compared to the MpR 
and LpR types. The comparisons MpR versus Lpr and Mpr versus LpR are indeterminate in the 
sense that we cannot conclude anything about the relative sequence of trades among these types.   
 
5.3. All Acts: Bids, Asks and Cancellations 
 
A key issue is whether position on the inverse demand curve influences the attempt to trade or 
the ability to trade. Do the traders with the highest gains from trade do so early because they are 
“at the market place” early or is it that they find it easier to be successful once they are there and 
thus trade earlier?  Traders bid, ask, and cancel orders with the sole aim of a trade. Since in the 
experiment each trader had only one unit to trade, a trader exits the market once she has bought a 
unit or sold a unit. The next result demonstrates that it is the relative fact that those with higher 
market potential exert earlier and greater effort that leads to the Marshallian path and not because 
the greater ability alone. Thus, we have the following results. 
 
Result 4. Traders with higher potential profits in francs (profits relative to the equilibrium) act 
(bid/ask/take-bid/take-ask/cancel) earlier in a period relative to other traders.  
 
Support: The average act times for the Hp, Mp and Lp types are 66.60, 85.40, and 109.52 seconds 
respectively, suggesting that the traders with higher potential gains from trade act earlier on an 
average compared to the lower value types. Table 6 gives the average act time for each of these 
types subdivided by exchange rate type. Figure 8 shows the number of acts done by each of the 
three type traders, Hp, Mp and Lp. It is clear that the Hp types are more active in the starting 
intervals when compared to the later intervals. This is true for the Mp types also. Also, note that 
the Mp types dominate the Hp types when it comes to being active towards the latter half of the 
trading period. However, notice from Figure 8 that the low types are active throughout and 
certainly more active relative to the Hp and Mp traders for the latter half of the time intervals.  
 
Figures 4 and 8 summarize the above results on trades and acts. When the market opens, the 
traders not knowing the valuations or costs of other traders start bidding/asking but most of the 
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trades are done among the high valuation buyers and low cost sellers (these traders have the 
highest gains from exchange) followed by the middle type traders. See the bulk of the trades for 
the Hp type traders are towards the beginning of the period in Figure 4. In some sense, the traders 
having higher gains from exchange are positioning themselves best in the market. This 
phenomenon removes more of these traders as compared to the other types. The low valuation 
buyers and high cost sellers keep on bidding and asking but being limited by their incentives they 
can’t compete with the high and middle type traders. Thus, most of the trades for these low types 
are towards the end of the period.   
 
Result 5: Traders with high exchange rate do not act (bid/ask/take-bid/take-ask/cancel) earlier 
relative to the low exchange rate. Exchange rate doesn't make a difference. 
 
Support: The average act times for the traders with high exchange rate (R) and low exchange rate 
(r) are 91.57 and 88.50 seconds respectively. Thus, there is no support for the theory that traders 
with high exchange rate act faster when compared to the traders with low exchange rates. Also 
see Table 6 for the details on the average time for an act. 
 
5.4. Market Versus Limit Orders 
 
We now turn to a secondary question about whether there is a relationship between limit and 
market orders and the position on the market demand and supply curve occupied by the agents 
involved in the transaction. A limit order provides a free option to counter-parties who can 
exercise the option by tendering a “market order”.  The option conveys information about the 
willingness to transact that trading parties might not wish to reveal. To facilitate the analysis, we 
introduce the concept of ratio, which we define as the profit a subject actually earned divided by 
the profit she would earn at the equilibrium. In a sense, this measures a subject’s efficiency in 
making profit in the market. Since the l type traders are not supposed to trade under the 
competitive equilibrium theory, we drop these types from analysis whenever there is a discussion 
of the ratio. We have two results in this section, first concerning the profitability of market and 
limit orders among different trader types and second focusing on the portion of the market and 
limit orders for different trader types. 
 
Result 6. There is no significant difference in the profitability of market orders and limit orders.  
 
Support: Figure 9 plots the average value of the ratio for market orders and limit orders across 
all the different types. Clearly, this ratio is almost the same among the market orders and the 
limit orders for the H and h traders. The ratio for these traders is close to 1 implying that these 
traders earn on an average what they should earn given their position on the demand curve and 
the equilibrium price. Market orders are slightly more profitable on average than limit orders 
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among the M traders while opposite is true among the m traders. But for the L traders, market 
orders are highly profitable compared to limit orders.  
 
Result 7. Traders with high (middle) redemption value tend to prefer market (limit) orders. 
However, among those traders with low (or no) gains from exchange, there is no clear 
preference between market and limit orders. 
 
Support: Table 7 gives the total number of orders submitted by each of the trader types (by 
redemption value) subdivided into the number of market and limit orders. For the Lp type, the 
proportion of market to limit orders is around 1 implying that there is no trend for these traders to 
be on one side of the order. However, this proportion is 1.2 for the Hp types and 0.82 for the Mp 
types suggesting that Hp traders tend to prefer market orders while the Mp traders prefer limit 
orders.  
 
The above two results combined suggests that even though there is no significant difference in 
the profitability of market order and limit order, on an average, Hp traders tend to be on the take-
side whereas Mp traders tend to be on the taken-side.  
 
5.5. Effect of Experience 
In this section, we provide a few observations related to the experience of the subjects.17 
Although the experiments were not designed to test the effect of experience on the various 
aspects of the market, the fact that few subjects participated in more than one experiment 
allowed us to make the following observations. 
Observation 1. The average time to trade for experienced subjects was lower than the 
inexperienced subjects. Experienced traders traded earlier on an average when compared with 
the inexperienced ones. This trend is true among all types, by franc values and also by exchange 
rates, except for the type L traders. See Table 8 for the average time for a subject to trade across 
different experience levels and types. 
Observation 2. Experienced subjects picked market orders earlier on average than the 
inexperienced ones, except among the l types. However, no such pattern was observed for limit 
orders. The last two columns of Table 8 gives the average time taken to submit a limit order and 
to pick a market order for each of the trader types and also for different experience levels. 
Observation 3. Average market order to limit order ratio is marginally higher among 
experienced traders when compared to the inexperienced ones, except for the type m traders. See 
Table 8 for the values of the ratio among market and limit orders differentiated by types. See the 
                                            
17 We define experience as being present in more than one experiment out of the four conducted. Thus, if a subject 
participated in only one of the experiments, he is considered inexperienced.  
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last column in Table 9 for the values of the average ratio by different types and experience 
levels.  
 
SECTION 6:  SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
That markets converge to the equilibrium predicted by classical competitive demand and supply 
is well known but exactly how that happens is not well known.  The Walrasian model holds that 
market equilibration works through price adjustments with the size of price changes dictated by 
the magnitude of excess demand and the allocations determined by those who acted to change 
price.  The first theorem of welfare economics tells us that the resulting competitive equilibrium 
allocations are efficient.  By contrast, Marshall has market equilibration working through volume 
adjustment with the adjustment dictated by the inverse excess demand through an efficiency 
seeking path.  That is, the Marshall model is that the path of market development follows the 
maximum gains from trade.  The intuition of the Marshallian model can be associated with the 
second theorem of welfare economics.  Markets converge to an efficient allocation, gains from 
trade are exhausted, and the efficient allocation becomes supported by prices as a competitive 
equilibrium. 
Both Marshall and Walras hold a principle of equilibrium and focus on the dynamics of 
equilibration but both are incomplete.  Walrasian model sees price adjustments as the organizing 
principle with the mechanisms for price change left to a fictional auctioneer.  We can now see 
that bids and asks in the continuous double auction carry part of the burden of the auctioneer.  
The Marshallian model focuses on the rate of exchange and trades as the driving force of market 
convergence but provided no explanation of the coordination that brought together the particular 
sequence of trades.  We can now see that the bids and asks of the continuous double auction 
contribute to the coordination and the relative aggressiveness of agents in tendering bids and asks 
serves as the vehicle for transactions speed. 
Experimental evidence suggests that phenomenon exists to support both theories of market 
adjustment in the context of the continuous double auction.  That the magnitude of excess 
demand influences price changes is supported by studies of stability and thus give life to the 
Walrasian model.  The results reported here demonstrate that Marshall also has a role to play by 
determining who will trade.  Thus, the two theories are complements, each bringing a different 
and independent principle to the theory of market adjustments.  The two theories are not simply 
inverses of each other but explain different features of the adjustment process. Marshall tells us 
who will trade and the speed at which trades will take place and that trades will take place along 
the most efficient, wealth creating path. Walras tells us how prices will evolve when they do 
trade and that the ultimate prices will support equilibrium volumes and efficiency. Those 
theoretical principles are reflected in the data.   
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Paradoxes and challenges remain.  The results reported here demonstrate that the adjustment 
within the market is Marshallian but analysis of stability demonstrates that in the absence of an 
externality the dynamic principle of price adjustment is Walrasian.  This suggests that the two 
together are still incomplete, inviting theories of expectations and the role of small price 
adjustments.  The adjustments of multiple markets, which was the primary concern of Edgeworth 
and Walras remains to be studied as are the implications of multiple unit preferences and trades. 
Similarly, the many modes of market organization are yet to be examined to determine what 
vestiges of the Marshallian adjustment model might be present or exactly what institutional 
features might facilitate its presence in the continuous double auction with a book. 
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Figure 1:  Marshallian versus Walrasian dynamics. 
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Figure 2: Types: Demander prices and supplier costs in a market. 
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Figure 3: Equilibrium, mean and median prices each period. 
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Figure 4: The number of traders by high (Hp), middle (Mp) and low (Lp) redemption value types 
involved in trades taking place in each of the time intervals. 
 
 
Figure 5: Proportion of type HpR and MpR traders involved in trades till tth second (as a 
proportion of HpR + MpR types). 
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Figure 6: Gains from exchange over time. 
 
 
Figure 7: The number of high (R) and low (r) exchange rate traders involved in trades taking 
place in each of the time intervals. 
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Figure 8: The number of acts by high (Hp), middle (Mp) and low (Lp) redemption value types in 
each of the time intervals. 
 
 
 
Figure 9:  Profitability of market and limit order by types. 
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Table 1. Redemption values, costs, exchange rates for the subjects each period. 
(a) Buyer side parameters 
period  Buyer ID  121  123  125  127  129  131  Equilibrium 
0 (practice) 
redemption 
values  500  500  500  500  500  500  450 
1  900  890  650  640  525  485  500 
2  1190  950  940  825  785  1200  800 
3  700  690  575  535  950  940  550 
4  990  875  835  1250  1240  1000  850 
5  625  585  1000  990  750  740  600 
6  885  1300  1290  1050  1040  925  900 
7  911  901  661  651  536  496  511 
8  1203  963  953  838  798  1213  813 
9  709  699  584  544  959  949  559 
10  1001  886  846  1261  1251  1011  861 
11  638  598  1013  1003  763  753  613 
12  894  1309  1299  1059  1049  934  909 
exchange rate 1‐6 
0.65 
cent  2 cent 
0.65 
cent  2 cent 
0.65 
cent  2 cent 
exchange rate 7‐12  2 cent 
0.65 
cent  2 cent 
0.65 
cent  2 cent 
0.65 
cent 
 
(b) Supply side parameters 
period  seller ID  122  123  126  128  130  132  Equilibrium 
0 
(practice)  costs  400  400  400  400  400  400  450 
1  100  110  350  360  475  515  500 
2  410  650  660  775  815  400  800 
3  400  410  525  565  150  160  550 
4  710  825  865  450  460  700  850 
5  575  615  200  210  450  460  600 
6  915  500  510  750  760  875  900 
7  111  121  361  371  486  526  511 
8  423  663  673  788  828  413  813 
9  409  419  534  574  159  169  559 
10  721  836  876  461  471  711  861 
11  588  628  213  223  463  473  613 
12  924  509  519  759  769  884  909 
exchange rate 1‐6 
0.65 
cent  2 cent 
0.65 
cent  2 cent 
0.65 
cent  2 cent 
exchange rate 7‐12  2 cent 
0.65 
cent  2 cent 
0.65 
cent  2 cent 
0.65 
cent 
Table 2. Convergence of market price across periods (Linear Regression). 
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Number of observations 48 
F (5, 43) 3.07 
Prob > F 0.0185 
R-squared 0.1334 
Root MSE 78.564 
  
 coefficient Robust 
   SE 
    t Prob >t 95% confidence interval 
B11 -32.01 61.40 -0.52 0.61 [-155.83          91.80] 
B12 -120.83 97.04 -1.25 0.22 [-316.54          74.88] 
B13 24.06 35.15 0.68 0.50 [-46.82            94.93] 
B14 -79.33 25.32 -3.13 0.00 [-130.40          28.26] 
B2 -6.75 14.75 -0.46 0.65 [-36.51             23.00] 
 
Table 3. Average trading time (in seconds) for the different types. 
Type High exchange rate (R) Low exchange rate (r) 
Hp 77.90 71.39 
Mp 110.43 135.54 
Lp 175.09 161.41 
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Table 4. Series of binomial tests for whether the proportion of first type traders is less than or 
equal to the second type traders in each row (involved in trades) and for each of the time 
intervals. 
comparison                                  Time Interval (in seconds) 
1-25  26-50 51-100 101-150 151-200 201-240 
HpR vs MpR 0.003 0.5 0.832 0.225 0.975 0.817 
HpR vs LpR 0 0.029 0.002 0.001 0.398 0.999 
MpR vs LpR 0.017 0.029 0 0.01 0.014 0.986 
Hpr vs Mpr 0 0.173 0.168 0.726 0.992 0.999 
Hpr vs Lpr 0 0 0.001 0.035 0.949 0.998 
Mpr vs Lpr 0.647 0.004 0.016 0.009 0.206 0.424 
HpR vs Hpr 0.386 0.754 0.832 0.168 0.5 0.207 
MpR vs Mpr 0.042 0.398 0.168 0.653 0.685 0.937 
LpR vs Lpr 0.793 0.079 0.841 0.647 0.97 0.185 
HpR vs Mpr 0 0.398 0.5 0.358 0.992 0.991 
HpR vs Lpr 0 0.002 0.016 0.004 0.949 0.985 
Hpr vs MpR 0.007 0.246 0.5 0.583 0.975 0.952 
Hpr vs LpR 0 0.006 0 0.016 0.398 1 
MpR vs Lpr 0.083 0.002 0.001 0.023 0.366 0.91 
Mpr vs LpR 0.327 0.048 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.76 
 
Table 5. Summary of all possible binary comparisons (for trades). 
 HpR MpR LpR Hpr Mpr Lpr 
HpR xxx R (0.00) R (0.09) * (0.99) R (0.00) R (0.00) 
MpR ----------- xxx R (0.92) C (1.00) R (0.00) R (0.00) 
LpR ----------- ------------ xxx C (0.73) * (0.06) * (0.00) 
Hpr ----------- ------------ ------------ xxx R (0.01) R (0.03) 
Mpr ----------- ------------ ------------ ------------ xxx * (0.99) 
Lpr ----------- ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ xxx 
xxx: no comparison possible 
R (C): row (column) type trades earlier compared to column (row) type 
*: indeterminate 
The p-values of the test Bf – Bi >= 0 described in section 3.2 are included in parentheses. The initial 
point is taken to be at 25 seconds and final is at the close of the trading period. 
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Table 6. Average act time (in seconds) for the different types. 
Type High exchange rate (R) Low exchange rate (r) 
Hp 68.54 64.31 
Mp 82.59 88.07 
Lp 114.82 103.93 
 
Table 7. Number of market, limit and total orders by types. 
 Market orders Limit orders Total number of 
orders 
H 
h 
M 
m 
L 
l 
42 
36 
28 
35 
24 
13 
30 
35 
42 
35 
27 
9 
72 
71 
70 
70 
51 
22 
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Table 8. Effect of experience on various aspects of the market. All entries are in seconds. 
Type Avg. Trading Time Market orders Limit orders 
experienced inexperienced experienced inexperienced experienced inexp 
H 
h 
M 
m 
L 
l 
Low 
exchange 
rate (r) 
High 
exchange 
rate (R) 
50.15 
74.85 
121.07 
109.54 
180.89 
133.33 
109.71 
 
99.33 
74.09 
89.87 
125.05 
130.27 
169.73 
167.62 
116.11 
 
109.24 
42.88 
79.62 
106.58 
113.15 
159.91 
175 
111.61 
 
89.43 
75.04 
96.57 
140.19 
144.32 
162.62 
161.13 
115.56 
 
109.90 
62.50 
70.08 
131.29 
105.92 
213.86 
81.25 
107.56 
 
110.16 
72.90 
82.86 
115.36 
116.23 
174.35 
178 
116.63 
 
108.56 
 
Table 9. Profitability by type, experience level among limit and market orders. 
Type Average ratio among 
Limit orders 
Average ratio among 
Market orders 
Overall average ratio 
experienced inexperienced experienced inexperienced experienced inexperienced 
H 
h 
M 
m 
L 
1.03 
1.03 
1.00 
1.06 
1.37 
0.99 
1.01 
1.00 
1.10 
0.64 
1.05 
1.05 
1.10 
0.85 
1.56 
0.98 
1.01 
1.01 
1.10 
1.43 
1.04 
1.04 
1.04 
0.96 
1.48 
0.99 
1.01 
1.01 
1.10 
0.95 
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Appendix.  
Instructions to subjects 
Instructions 
In this experiment you will make decisions to trade one unit of a commodity. Some of you will 
be buyers and some of you will be sellers. Trading will occur in a sequence of periods. You will 
remain in the same assignment (as a buyer or seller) throughout the experiment. The prices at 
which you are able to trade in each trading period will determine your earnings in francs 
(experimental currency) which will be converted to US dollars at a specified exchange rate. The 
exchange rates each period will be displayed on your screen. It may or may not be different for 
different periods and across the participants. You should keep track of your exchange rate each 
period and your franc earnings each period. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid the 
total of the dollar earnings that you have earned each period. You will be given a complete 
description about trading using the software in a moment and will have enough time to get used 
to the trading interface when we conduct the practice period.  
If you have any question, please raise your hand and we will come and assist you. 
Buyer-specific instructions 
You have a private market where you can sell a unit of the commodity (to the experimenter) at a 
certain price. You will start out with no unit of the commodity but, some endowment of francs 
that will let you buy a unit in the public market at a certain price and re-sell it to the experimenter 
through your private market. The endowment of francs will be taken away at the end of a period. 
You earn the difference in the price at which you sell in your private market and the price at 
which you are able to buy the unit from the public market. If you do nothing, you earn nothing. 
Seller-specific instructions 
You start out with 1 unit of the commodity and no endowment of francs. You need to sell the 
unit in the public market at a certain price and then go to your private market and buy from the 
experimenter so that you again end up with 1 unit of the commodity before the trading period 
terminates. You earn the difference in the price at which you are able to sell in the public market 
and the price at which you buy from the private market. If you do nothing, you earn nothing. 
 
